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But, this remedy was not selected.'
I Introduction
In December 1998, the Federal Trade Commission (Commission) charged
Mylan Laboratories (Mylan) with restraint of trade, monopolization, and
conspiracy to monopolize the markets for two popular anti-anxiety drugs.2
* J.D. Candidate, Washington and Lee University School of Law, 2001.
1. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251,262 (1972) (holding that states could
not proceed asparenspatriae on behalf of their citizens under Clayton Act § 4).
2. See Federal Trade Commission, Mylan, Nation's Second Largest Generic Drug
Maker, Charged with Restraint of Trade, Conspiracy & Monopolization (Dec. 21, 1998), at
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The Commission alleged that illegal activity by Mylan enabled the company
to raise the wholesale price of one of the drugs, Lorazepam, from $7.30 to
$190.00 per bottle The Commission accused the pharmaceuticals company
of making excessive profits on drugs used to treat the elderly and the infirm.
Attorneys General from nearly a dozen states announced that they too would
join in the suit.' They asserted both federalr and pendant state claims.'
The Commission's action against Mylan seems unremarkable given the
high number of antitrust enforcement actions in recent years. The front pages
of major newspapers now frequently feature stories concerning the latest anti-
trust cases.' These have included civil actions against Microsoft, Intel, Ameri-
http'/www.fte.gov/opa/1998/9812/mylanpv.htm. The complaint charged that Mylan Labora-
tories (Mylan) violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act by seeking exclusive
license agreements for Lorazepam and Clorazepate and, despite no significant increase in its
costs, by raising the prices it charged wholesalers, retail pharmacy chains, and other customers
by between 2000 and 3000 percent. Id. at 2.
3. Id. at 1.
4. See id. (citing comments of William 3. Baer, then Director, Bureau of Competition,
Federal Trade Commission).
5. Id. Thirty-two states eventually joined the suit. FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F.
Supp. 2d 25, 32 (D.D.C. 1999) (order granting in part and denying in part defendants' motions
to dismiss).
6. See Mylan, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 40 (setting forth states' claims under Clayton Act). The
states asserted federal claims for restitution and disgorgement under Section 16 of the Clayton
Act, which permits plaintiffs to sue for injunctive relief "against threatened loss or damage by
a violation of the antitrust laws." Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1994). The court noted
that the holding in Illinois Brick that indirect purchasers are not injured within the meaning of
the Clayton Act rested in part on the conclusion that permitting indirect purchasers to sue would
create a serious risk of multiple liability for defendants. Mylan, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 41. The court
dismissed the states' federal claims because disgorgement would raise the specter of multiple
liability and allow the states to circumvent Illinois Brick through a novel interpretation of
Section 16. Id. at 41-42.
7. Mylan, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (setting forth state claims). The plaintiff states asserted
claims for violation of state antitrust statutes as well as state unfair and deceptive practice
statutes, variously referred to as consumer protection acts, consumers sales acts, deceptive trade
practices acts, consumer fraud acts, or "Little FTC Acts." 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
ANTIRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 654 n.938 (4th ed. 1997).
8. See James V. Grimaldi, MicrosoftDeal Seems Unlikel; Little ProgressSeen in Talks
to Settle Antitst Case, WASH. POST., Feb. 18, 2000, at El (reporting that Microsoft unlikely
to settle in monopolization case brought by Justice Department); Justice DepartmentInvestigat-
ing NewsprintIndustry, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 18,2000, at C4 (announcing investigation of possible
anticompetitive conduct in newsprint industry); Jim Landers, Global Mergers Fuel Questions
About Need for International Trust Busting, DAuiAS MORNmIG NEWS, Feb. 14, 2000, at ID
(reporting that multinational companies overwhelm national antitrust agencies); Tobacco
Growers Sue Four Cigarette Makers on Antitrust Grounds, WALL ST. ,., Feb. 17, 2000, at B2
(announcing suit charging tobacco companies of colluding to undermine quota system that
protects farmers by regulating how much tobacco is grown).
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can Airlines, and Visa and Mastercard.9 In addition, high-profile criminal
prosecutions have led to the indictment of vitamin manufacturers engaged in
an international cartel and the trial of executives at Archer Daniels Midland.10
The case against Mylan, however, was unique. The Federal Trade Com-
mission sought $120 million in restitution" and disgorgement 2 of profits. 3
According to the Commission, this was the amount by which Mylan profited
from illegally overcharging for its drugs. 4 The district court in FTC v. Mylan
Laboratories, Inc.'5 concluded that the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC
Act) 1 6 gave the Commission authority to seek restitution and disgorgement of
profits. 7 This was the firsttime a court has permitted the Commissionto seek
such relief in an antitrust case. 8
Moreover, the Commission sought to recover this money on behalf of
indirect purchasers. 9 Mylan sells the drugs it produces primarily to whole-
9. Stephen M. Axin, Looking Back atAntitrust Law: New Modelfor New Economy,
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 29,1999, at 6.
10. Id.
11. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 32 (D.D.C. 1999) (noting amount
of damage demand). See generally 1 DANB.DOBBS,DOBBS LAWOF REmDES § 4.1(1), at 555
(2d ed. 1993) (discussing nature of restitution). Dobbs explains that "[riestitution measures
the remedy by the defendant's gain and seeks to force disgorgement of that gain." Id. Restitu-
tion "differs in its goal or principle from damages, which measures the remedy by the plaintiff's
loss and seeks to provide compensation for that loss." Id.
12. See SEC v. Huffman, 996 F.2d 800,802 (5th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing disgorgement
from restitution). Disgorgement is not precisely the same as restitution. Id. Disgorgement, like
restitution, wrests ill-gotten gains from wrongdoers and prevents them from enriching them-
selves through their wrongs. Id. Unlike restitution, disgorgement does not aim to compensate
the victims of wrongful acts. Id. In antitrust cases, however, the Clayton Act gives injured
parties the right to recover the overcharge. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994). Thus, the
Commission likely would have to use any disgorgement it recovers to compensate persons
injured by the antitrust violation. For the purposes of this Note, the distinction is not significant.
13. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Reief, Federal Trade Commission v.
Mylan Labs., Inc., Cv. 98-3114 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 21,1998), at http'//www.ftc.gov/os/1998/
9812/mylanemp.htm; see also FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 n.2 (D.D.C. 1999)
(order granting motion for reconsideration).
14. See Federal Trade Commission, supra note 2, at 1 (asserting that amount sought was
"an estimate of the ill-gotten gains resulting from the illegal conduct").
15. 62F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 1999).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994).
17. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25,36-37 (D.D.C. 1999) (concluding
that Section 13(b) of FTC Act authorizes Commission to seek equitable monetary relief).
18. See infra note 96 and accompanying text (noting that courts have permitted Commis-
sion to seek equitable monetary relief only in cases involving unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices).
19. See Federal Trade Commission, supra note 2, at 1 ("Where possible, the agency said,
it would restore to consumers the monetary harm they have suffered.").
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salers and retail pharmacy chains, who in turn sell them to consumers."0 Thus,
the consumers who bought the drugs for which Mylan overcharged were in-
direct purchasers. While the district court did not expressly permit the Com-
mission to recover on behalf of indirect purchasers, it assumed that the Com-
mission had authority to seek such relief.2
In llinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,' however, the Supreme Court held that
indirect purchasers are not injured within the meaning of the federal antitrust
laws.'s Thus, for over twenty years, llinois Brickhas barred indirect purchas-
ers from recovering damages in antitrust cases.24 Now, by permitting the
Commission to proceed with its claims for restitution, the court in Mylan
appears to have opened a backdoor through which indirect purchasers may
recover for antitrust violations. Opening this door risks giving rise to the very
problems that the Supreme Court sought to avoid in Illinois Brick multiple
20. Id. at 2.
21. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 n.2 (D.D.C. 1999) (order granting
motion for reconsideration) ("[Although] no court has addressed the specific issue of restitution
on behalf of indirect purchasers, . . . the Court will assume that the FTC does have the authority
to seek such relief."); FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 (D.D.C. 1999) (permit.
ting Commission to seek disgorgement or any other form of equitable relief).
22. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
23. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 729 (1977) (holding that indirect
purchasers cannot recover damages for violations of federal antitrust laws). In Illinois Brick,
the Supreme Court considered whether indirect purchasers could recover damages from a
manufacturer for antitrust violations on the theory that the direct purchaser "passed on" an il-
legal overcharge to them. Id. at 726. The Court reasoned that it had to either overrule Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968), in which it had held that
antitrust defendants could not use the pass-on theory as a defense, or bar indirect purchasers
from using the theory against an alleged violator. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 728-29. Allowing
offensive but not defensive use of the theory would subject defendants to multiple liability
because even though an indirect purchaser had already recovered for all or part of an overcharge
passed on to it, a direct purchaser could still recover the full amount of the overcharge. Id. at
730. According to the Court, permitting the use of pass-on theories generally "would transform
[antitrust] actions into massive efforts to apportion the recovery among all potential plaintiffs
that could have absorbed part of the overcharge - from direct purchasers to middlemen to
ultimate consumers." Id. at 737. Because it concluded that the antitrust laws would be more
effectively enforced by allowing direct purchasers to recover the full amount of the overcharge,
the Court declined to allow each plaintiff potentially affected by the overcharge to introduce
"massive evidence and complicated theories" in an attempt to recover the amount absorbed by
it. Id. at 741 (quoting Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 493) Thus, the Court held that direct pur-
chasers are injured to the full extent of the overcharge paid by them, and that indirect purchasers
are not injured by violations of the federal antitrust laws. Id. at 746.
24. See Wflliam H. Page, TheLimitsofStateIndirectPurchaserSuits Class Certification
in the Shadow of Illinois Brick, 67 ANITRUST L.J. 1, 1 (1999) ("The Court has steadfastly
protected the Illinois Brick barrier from erosion in federal antitrust litigation." (citation omitted));
see also Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199,219 (1990) (barring states from asserting
claims on behalf of indirect purchasers underparenspatriae provision of Clayton Act § 4).
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liability for defendants,"5 complexity,26 and discouraging private antitrust
SUitS.2
In addition, the Mylan court permitted states with "Little FTC Acts"'
that prompt courts to follow interpretations of federal law, or that permit the
state to seek equitable relief, to seek restitution on behalf of indirect purchas-
ers also.29 Because the FTC Act gives the Commission authority to seek
restitution on behalf of indirect purchasers," the court reasoned that the states
also may seek such relief under their Little FTC Acts.3 In addition, many of
the states' Little FTC Acts provide a private right of action.32 Because these
statutes direct courts to follow interpretations of federal law, and because the
Mylan court assumed that the FTC Act permits the Commission to recover
restitution on behalf of indirect purchasers, the Mylan decision may addition-
ally provide indirect purchasers in some states with a private right of action
under state law for antitrust violations.33
25. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 731 (finding risk of multiple liability unacceptable).
26. See id. at 732 (observing that complexity of apportioning injury to indirect purchasers
would increase costs of recovery).
27. See id. at 745 (noting that apportioning recovery among direct and indirect purchasers
would reduce benefits to each plaintiff).
28. See supra note 7 (explaining nomenclature of state statutes prohibiting unfair and
deceptive acts and practices).
29. FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4-5 (D.D.C. 1999) (order granting motion
for reconsideration) (reinstating claims for restitution and disgorgement on behalf of indirect pur-
chasers by Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Ohio, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia). Initially, the court
had dismissed most of the claims by the plaintiff states for restitution on behalf of indirect
purchasers. FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 43 (D.D.C. 1999). The court ex-
plained that it was dismissing the claims because restitution raises the same "specter of duplica-
tive recoveries" as damages, which are barred by Illinois Brick, and because statutes or case law
in each of the states prompts courts to follow federal statutes when interpreting state laws. Id.
Because federal antitrust laws bar recovery by indirect purchasers, the court dismissed the
states' claims. Id. On reconsideration, the court said it would look to its interpretation of the
FTC Act, which permitted the Commission to recover equitable monetary relief on behalf of
indirect purchasers, in interpreting state statutes and reinstated the states' claims. Mylan, 99 F.
Supp. 2d at 4-5.
30. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing court's conclusions regarding
indirect purchasers).
31. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 n.2 (D.D.C. 1999) (order granting
motion for reconsideration) ("As this Court had already held that the FTC could pursue
equitable remedies, the Court reasoned that Idaho should be permitted to pursue similar kinds
of equitable relief under [its Little FTC Act].").
32. 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTTRUST LAW, supra note 7, at 654.
33. See id. at n.940 (noting that state laws that defer to interpretations of FTC Act may
permit private right of action for violation of FTC standard).
1009
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1005 (2000)
In Part II, this Note examines the authority ofthe Federal Trade Commis-
sion to seek equitable monetary relief.34 This Note then considers whether
Illinois Brick bars the Commission from seeking such relief in an antitrust
case, and in particular, on behalf of indirect purchasers. 5 In Part II, this Note
discusses the implications of the Mylan decision for enforcement of state
antitrust laws.3 ' Finally, this Note concludes that the Mylan court wrongly
concluded that the Commission could recover equitable monetary relief and
erroneously assumed that the Commission could seek such relief on behalf of
indirect purchasers.
37
ff. Federal Trade Commission Authority to Seek Restitution
A. Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act
InMylan, the Commission sought an injunction, as well as restitution and
disgorgement, under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act.38 Section 13(b) does not
expressly provide for equitable monetary relief, it permits the Commission to
go into court and seek an injunction to stop ongoing or imminent violations
of the FTC Act.39 The Mylan court concluded that by seeking a permanent
34. See infra notes 38-96 and accompanying text (examining whether FTC Act authorizes
Commission to seek restitution).
35. See infra notes 97-206 and accompanying text (examining whether FTC Act autho-
rizes Commission to seek restitution in antitrust cases).
36. See infra notes 207-47 and accompanying text (exploring implications for state anti-
trust laws of interpreting FTC Act to give Commission authority to seek restitution).
37. 'See infra notes 248-54 and accompanying text (concluding that Mylan was wrongly
decided).
38. See Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, Federal Trade Commission
v. Mylan Labs., Inc., Cv. 98-3114 (D.D.C. filed Dee. 21,1998), athttp'/www.ft.gov/os/1998/
9812/mylancmp.htm (bringing action under Section 13(b) of FTC Act to secure permanent
injunction and other equitable relief against Mylan).
39. Federal Trade Commission Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1994). Section 13(b)
provides:
(b) Temporary restraining orders; preliminary injunctions
Whenever the Commission has reason to believe -
that any person, partnership, or corporation is violating, or is about to
violate, any provision of law enforced by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, and
that the enjoining thereof pending the issuance of a complaint by the
Commission and until such complaint is dismissed by the Commission
or set aside by the court on review, or until the order of the Commis-
sion made thereon has become final, would be in the interest of the
public -
the Commission... may bring suit in a district court of the United States
to enjoin any such act or practice. Upon a proper showing that, weighing
1010
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injunction against Mylan, the Commission had invoked the court's "inherent
equitable powers," and the court allowed the Commission to proceed with its
claims for restitution and disgorgement.4"
1. Construction
The legislative history of the FTC Act and subsequent amendments to the
Act, including Section 13(b) itself, suggest that Congress did not intend
Section 13(b) to authorize the Commissionto seek equitable monetary relief.4
The FTC Act prohibits "unfair methods of competition" - the antitrust prong
of the Act - as well as "unfair or deceptive acts or practices."42 When the
FTC Act was enacted in 1914, Congress considered, but declined to provide,
a private remedy for harm caused by violations of the Act.43 Opponents of
providing a private remedy argued that the vagueness of the prohibition
against unfair methods of competition - which permits the Commission to
define violations of the FTC Act on a case-by-case basis - made it unfair to
penalize people for conduct that they may have had no reason to believe was
unlawful at the time.' Although the Commission enforces the FTC Act
against activities that would constitute per se violations of the federal antitrust
the equities and considering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate
success, such action would be in the public interest, and after notice to the
defendant, a temporary restraining order or apreliminary injunction may
be granted .... Provided further, That in proper cases the Commission
may seek, and after proper proof, the court may issue, apermanentinjunc-
tion....
Id. (emphasis added).
40. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25,36-37 (D.D.C. 1999) (concluding,
without citing illinois Brick, that FTC may seek equitable monetary relief).
41. See generally Peter C. Ward, Restitution for Consumers Under the Federal Trade
Commission Act: Good Intentions or Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 1139,
1174-79 (1992) (arguing that Congress did not intend Section 13(b) to authorize Commission
to seek restitution).
42. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(aXl) (1994). Originallythe FTC
Act only contained the prohibition on "unfair methods of competition"; the prohibition on
"unfair and deceptive acts" was added in 1938. See Ward, supra note 41, at 1157-62 (discuss-
ing legislative history of FTC Act). This Note will only address "unfair methods of competi-
tion," the antitrust prong of the Act.
43. See Ward, supra note 41, at 1149 (noting that during debate members considered
adding private cause of action for treble damages).
44. See id. at 1150 (citing remarks of members including Sen. Williams, 51 CONG. REC.
13,119 (1914)). Congress left it to the Commission to decide what practices constitute "unfair
methods of competition." See Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321,324 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing remarks
of Senator Newlands, principal sponsor of Act, regarding Commission power to define viola-
tions ofAct, 51 CoNG. REC. 13116 (1914)).
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laws,4' that does not change the fact that Congress intended to limit the
remedies that the Commission could seek under the FTC Act.
In Heater v. Fb-TC,46 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered
whether Commission authority to seek equitable monetary relief was consis-
tent with this legislative history.4  The Commission had asserted that its
authority to issue administrative cease-and-desist orders, 8 the traditional
remedy for violations of the FTC Act,49 included ancillary equitable power to
order restitution for consumers.5  The Heater court rejected the Commis-
sion's assertion, concluding that such power would permit the Commission to
order relief that would be given to private parties for harm caused by acts that
occurred before the Commission had determined that those acts violated the
statute.5' The court noted that Congressional debate over the Act had centered
on the breadth ofthe Commission's power to define "unfair" acts and the risk
45. See infra note 127 and accompanying text (explaining that Commission may proceed
under FTC Act against violation of Clayton, Sherman, and Robinson-Patman Act).
46. 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974).
47. See Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 323-24 (9th Cir. 1974) (concluding that Congress
limited consequences of violation of FTC Act to cease-and-desist order). In Heater, the Ninth
Circuit considered whether the Commission's power to issue a cease-and-desist order included
the power to order restitution of moneys obtained by "unfair and deceptive" business practices.
Id. at 321. The court rejected the Commission's argument that it was an unfair practice for the
petitioner to retain monies illegally obtained. Id. at 323. Such a construction of the Commis-
sion's power to define "unfair and deceptive" practices, the court reasoned, "would permit the
Commission to order private relief for harm caused by acts which occurred before the Commis-
sion had declared a statutory violation." Id. After reviewing the legislative history, the court
held that Congress did not give the Commission power to attach consequences retroactively to
conduct occurring before it issued a cease-and-desist order. Id. at 324.
48. See Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1994) (empowering
Commission to issue cease-and-desist orders). Section 5(b) of the FTC Act empowers the
Commission, after notice and hearing, to issue an order requiring a person found to have
engaged in unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices to "cease and
desist" from such conduct. ABA SECTION OF A fIRUST LAW, supra note 7, at 590.
49. ABA SECTION OFANTIrRUST LAW, supra note 7, at 589.
50. See Curtis Publ'g Co., 78 F.T.C. 1472,1516-17(1971) (asserting that FTC has author-
ity to order refunds to consumers injured by respondent's unfair or deceptive acts). In asserting
this power, the Commission relied upon the Supreme Court's assertion in Jacob Siegel Co. v.
FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946), that "courts will not interfere with FTC cease-and-desist orders
except where the remedy selected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to
exist." Curtis Publ'g Co., 78 F.T.C. at 1513. The remedy, however, must be reasonably related
to the purpose of the Act, that is, elimination of the offending practice in thefture. See Ward,
supra note 41, at 1149 (concluding that Congress intended cease-and-desist power to "stop
practices before they injured the public"). Neither the plain language of Section 5 nor the
legislative history of the FTC Act supported this assertion of authority. See id. at 1145-57
(setting out legislative history of cease-and-desist power).
51. See Heater, 503 F.2d at 323 (noting that power to order restitution would permit
private parties to receive monetary relief for conduct not yet defined as violation of FTC Act).
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that a person would not know whether a particular practice was unlawful. 2
The court concluded that, in an effort to avoid that risk, Congress had limited
the consequences of violation of-the Act to a cease-and-desist order.'3
Given this legislative history, it seems likely that, had Congress intended
to substantially alter the consequences of violating the FTC Act, it would have
done so expressly. Section 13(b), which was added to the FTC Act in 1973 as
an amendmentto the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act, 4 does not expressly authorize
the Commission to seek equitable monetary relief from those who have vio-
lated the Act. 5 It empowers the Commissionto go to court and seek a prelimi-
nary injunction against anyone it believes "is violating, or is about to violate,
any provision of law enforced by the... Commission." 6 Congress intended
this provisionto prevent those who violate the FTC Act or other Commission-
enforced law from continuing their activities after the Commission initiates a
complaint but before it issues a cease-and-desist order.57 Section 13(b) also
provides that the Commission may seek a permanent injunction in "proper
cases. 5s8  The Senate committee report on the legislation indicates that this
provision was intended to make the prosecution of routine fraud cases more
efficient by allowing the Commission to seek a permanent injunction rather
than issuing a cease-and-desist order.59 Thus, neither the language nor the
legislative history of Section 13(b) indicates that, in granting the Commission
52. See id. at 324 (noting that "the critical issue around which the Congressional debate
over the ... Act centered was the breadth of the Commission's power to define what would
constitute 'unfair acts'").
53. See id. at 324 ("[Tie reconcile the Commission's broad power with the need for a
specific notice to an individual who must conform his behavior to the terms of the Act, Con-
gress limited the consequences of violation of the Act to a cease and desist order.").
54. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat 576 (1973).
55. See supra note 39 (setting out relevant portions of Section 13(b)).
56. Federal Trade Commission Act § 13(bXl), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1994).
57. See 119 CONG. REc. 36,610 (1973) (Conference Committee Report) (explaining that
Section 13(b) would authorize Commission to seek preliminary injunctions to halt violations
pending issuance of cease-and-desist order); see also Ward, supra note 41, at 1176 (citing
remarks of Representative Smith) ("[t] is only good sense that where there is a probability that
the act will eventually be found illegal and the perpetrator ordered to cease, that some method
be available to protect innocent third parties while the litigation winds its way through final
decision.").
58. Federal Trade Commission Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1994). "Proper cases"
include those in which the FTC relies on established precedent and "does not desire to further
expand upon the prohibitions of the Federal Trade Commission Act through the issuance of a
cease-and-desist order." FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1982)
(quoting S. REP. No. 93-151, at 30-31 (1973)).
59. See S. REP. No. 93-151,at30-31 (1973) (noting that ability to seek permanent injunc-
tion will save resources and allow Commission to dispose of fraud cases more efficiently).
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the authority to seek an injunction, Congress intended to grant the Commission
authority to seek equitable monetary relief.
The addition of Section 19 to the FTC Act one year after the enactment
of Section 13(b) also suggests that Congress did not intend that Section 13(b)
give the Commission authority to seek equitable monetary relief.60 As origi-
nally drafted, the legislation would have allowed the Commission to seek
consumer redress, including restitution, for injury caused by unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices that were the subject of a cease-and-desist order.61 As
when Congress first enacted the FTC Act, the bill met with criticism that it
would punish people for conduct that they may have had no reason to believe
was unlawful 62 In the end, Congress limited the Commission's authority to
seek redress to situations in which the respondent was subject to a cease-and-
desist order for engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices that "a
reasonable man would have known under the circumstances were dishonest
or fraudulent."63 Furthermore, the Commission must seek such redress within
three years of when the acts or practices occurred.6
2. Interpretation by the Courts
The Commission nonetheless has been able to evade the limits imposed
on its authority to seek redress under Section 19 by seeking restitution under
Section 13(b) instead. Afterpassage of Section 13(b),the Commissionbrought
a number of cases in which courts had to determine what types of ancillary
relief the Commission could obtain when seeking a preliminary injunction.
65
In one such case, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit concluded that a
"hold separate" order - which requires an acquiring company to hold separate
the assets acquired through a merger pending determination of the merger's
legality - was "in form and effect a preliminary restraint. tes In a similar case,
60. Federal Trade Commission Act § 19,15 U.S.C. § 57(b) (1994).
61. S. 986, 92d Cong. (1971). Section 13(b) was lifted from this bill, further suggesting
that Congress did not contemplate that that section would provide any relief beyond injunction.
Ward, supra note 41, at 1179-80.
62. See 117 CoNG. REC. 39,849 (1971) (statements of Sens. Hurska, Magnuson, and
Cook).
63. Federal Trade Commission Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 57b(aX2) (1994). Section 19 also
provides for redress when respondent has violated an FTC Trade Regulation Rule. 15 U.S.C.
§ 57b(aX1). Note that Section 19 does not provide for restitution in cases that involve unfair
methods of competition.
64. Federal Trade Commission Act § 19,15 U.S.C. § 57b(d) (1994).
65. See FTC v. Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 665 F.2d 711, 717 (5th Cir. 1982) (freezing
assets); FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding assets
separate); FTC v. Southland Corp., 471 F. Supp. 1, 4 (DD.C. 1979) (same).
66. Weyerhaeuser, 665 F.2d at 1084 (holding that district court may consider restraints
other than injunction under Section 13(b)).
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the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that courts, in granting a
prelirminary injunction under Section 13(b), may freeze the assets of a corpo-
ration alleged to have engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices so that
the assets would be available in an action for redress under Section 19.67 Both
courts reasoned that Section 13(b), by giving courts the power to grant a
preliminary injunction, also authorizes a court to exercise 'the full range of
equitable remedies traditionally available to it."68 They concluded that, in
exercising this inherent equitable power, a district court could order relief,
ancillary to its power to order an injunction, that would prevent dissipation of
assets or funds that might constitute part of the relief eventually ordered.69
In concluding that they could issue equitable relief beyond what Sec-
tion 13(b) expressly provided, these courts relied upon Porter v. Warner
Holding Co.,7" in which the Supreme Court held that a district court could
order restitution of excess rent charged by Warner Holding Company in
violation of the Emergency Price Control Act (EPC Act). The EPC Act
provided that when the Price Administrator found that a person was charging
prices higher than the Act permitted, the Administrator could seek a tempo-
rary or permanent injunction, restraining order, or other order to enforce corn-
67. See Southwest Sunsites, 665 F.2d at 722 (holding that Section 13(b) invokes inherent
equitable powers of district courts).
68. Id. at 718; see also Weyerhaeuser, 665 F.2d at 1084 (concluding that by authorizing
preliminary injunctive relief Section 13(b) "posts a clear entrance sign for FTC provisional relief
applications").
69. See SouthwestSunsites, 665 F.2d at 718 (citing SEC v. First Fin. Group, 645 F2d 429
(5th Cir. 1981) (appointing receiver); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Muller, 570 F2d
1296,1301 (5th Cir. 1978) (freezing defendant's assets); SEC v. ManorNursing Ctr., 458 F.2d
1082, 1106 (2d Cir. 1972) (freezing assets pending transfer to trustee)); see also Weyerhaeuser,
665 F.2d at 1084 (concluding that hold separate order "is not outside the range of relief a 13(b)
application may warrant").
70. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
71. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 403 (1946) (holding that district
court erred in not considering restitution order). In Porter, the Supreme Court considered
whether the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 gave a district court the power to order
restitution of rents collected by a landlord in excess of the permissible maximums. Id. at 396.
The Administrator of the Office of Price Control sought an injunction against, and restitution
from, Warner Holding Co. for exceeding the rent ceilings. Id. The Court found that by seeking
an injunction against Warner, the Administrator had invoked the inherent equitable powers of
the court. Id. at 398. The Court noted that those equitable powers "assume an even broader and
more flexible character" when the public interest is at stake. Id. A court could exercise the full
scope of its equitable powers unless limited by the statute. Id. In framing remedies, the Court
explained, courts must act primarily to give effect to the purposes of the Act and the policy of
Congress. Id. at 400. The Court concluded that neither the language nor the legislative history
of the statute restricted the equity powers of the court, and that ordering restitution of illegal
gains would encourage future compliance with the Act and thereby further the statute's policy
of preventing inflation. Id. at400-01.
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pliance with the Act. 2 The Supreme Court concluded that once the Adminis-
trator invoked the equitable power of the court by seeking an injunction, "all
the inherent equitable powers ofthe district court are available."" Moreover,
the Court asserted, "[The comprehensiveness ofthis equitable [power] is not
to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative com-
mand. 7 4 The Court found that the language of the EPC Act did not restrict
the courts' equitable power and, consequently, concluded that a district court
could enter an order requiring disgorgement of profits acquired in violation
of the Act?
5
The Ninth Circuit relied upon Porter when it became the first court to
hold that Section 13(b), by giving a district court authorityto grant a permanent
injunction, also gave a court authority to grant equitable monetary relief.76 In
FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc.,77 the Commission sought restitution of monies
obtained through a fraudulent scheme to sell business opportunities. 7 The
defendants argued that the Commission could only seek restitution as ex-
pressly provided for in Section 19; in cases in which Section 19 did not apply,
therefore, the Commission was limited to seeking an injunction under Section
72. Id. at397.
73. Id. at 398-99; see also Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288,296
(1960) (holding that in action to enjoin unlawful discharge, court may order restitution for
employees of wages lost due to such discharge). In Robert DeMario Jewelry, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its adherence to the doctrine of inherent equitable power set out in Porter. The
Court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act, which gave district courts the power to enjoin
employers from illegally discharging employees who sought enforcement of the Act, also
empowered courts to order restitution of wages lost due to such a discharge. Id. at 296. In
doing so, the Court expanded upon the contention in Porter that any limitation on a court's
inherent equitable power must be clearly set out by Congress and asserted that "[w]hen Congress
entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of prohibitions contained in a regulatory enactment,
it must be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of equity to provide complete
relief in light of the statutory purposes." Id. at 291-92 (quoting Clark v. Smith, 39 U.S. (13
Pet) 195,203).
74. Porter, 328 U.S. at 398.
75. See id. at 398-99 (noting that 'the language of [the statute] admits of no other conclu-
sion"). The Court also concluded that "the term 'other order' contemplates a remedy other than
that of an injunction or restraining order." Id. at 399. InMitchell v. RobertDeMario Jewelry,
361 U.S. 288,296 (1960), however, the Court rejected that distinction, noting that "[t]he applica-
bility of this principle is not to be denied [because Porter] went on to find in the language of the
statute affirmative confirmation of the power to order reimbursement" Id.
76. See FTC v. FI. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107,1111 (9th Cir. 1982) (relying on Porter
to hold that Section 13(b) giving court power to grant injunction also gives court power to grant
restitution).
77. 668 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1982).
78. See FTC v. RN. Singer, Inc. 668 F.2d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that
Commission sought refund of moneys paid by franchisees for pizza distribution franchises sold
by defendants).
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13(b). 79 The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument, noting that
Section 19 states that the remedies it provides "are in addition to, and not in
lieu of, any other remedy or right of action provided by State or Federal
law. °80 Thus, the court concluded that there was no "necessary or inescapable
inference" that Congress, in enacting Section 19, intended to restrict the broad
equitable power that Section 13(b) apparently granted to the district court.81
3. Applying Porter
Since Singer, four courts of appeals and numerous district courts have
permitted the Commission to seek equitable monetary relief under Section
13(b) for violations of the FTC Act that involved unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.' Despite this apparent consensus, there is reason to doubt that
Section 13(b) grants such authority to the courts.93 In Porter, the Supreme
Court explained that the inherent equitable power of the district court could
be limited by the plain language of the statute or "by a necessary and inescap-
able inference.'18 Although Section 13(b) does not expressly deny courts the
power to grant restitution, Section 19 raises "a necessary and inescapable infer-
ence" that Congress did not intend for the Commission to have the authority
to seek such relief."5 As noted earlier, Section 19 authorizes the Commission
to seek restitution only under narrowly defined conditions, indicating that
79. Id. at 1113.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 1112 (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395,398 (1946)).
82. See FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 1997) (granting restitution and dis-
gorgement); FTC v. Gem Merchandising Corp., 87 F.3d 466,470 (11th Cir. 1996) (concluding
that Section 13(b) permits district court to order disgorgement of illegally obtained funds); FTC
v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing with approval FTC v. HN.
Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1982) (granting restitution)); FTC v. Security Rare Coin
& Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1315 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that Section 13(b) empowers
district court to grant equitable monetary relief); see also FTC v. US Sales Corp., 785 F. Supp.
737, 752 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (concluding that court's power to issue permanent injunction includes
power to order restitution); FTC v. National Bus. Consultants, 781 F. Supp. 1136, 1141 (E.D.
La. 1991) (determining that Section 13(b) empowers district court to impose restitution).
83. See 119 CONG. REc. 36,611 (1973) (noting that Commission characterized Section
13(b) as "'gap-filling' measure" that would not expand reach of Commission's authority).
84. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395,398(1946). The Court asserted:
Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference,
restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be
recognized and applied. "The great principles of equity, securing complete justice,
should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction."
Id. (quoting Brown v. Swann, 36 U.S. (10 Pet) 497,503).
85. See Ward, supra note 41, at 1191-92 (noting that conclusion that Section 13(b)
provides unrestricted means of obtaining restitution creates conflict with Section 19).
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Congress intended to limit the Commission's authority to seek such relief.86
But, Section 19 states that the reliefprovided is "in addition to, and not in lieu
of," other available remedies, suggesting that Congress intended to expand the
Commission's authority, not limit authority it had granted a year earlier in
Section 13(b).-' Finally, had Section 13(b) granted the Commission unre-
stricted authority to seek restitution, the relief provided for in Section 19 -
enacted a year after the same Congress enacted Section 13(b) - would be
superfluous.
88
Porter also made clear that in framing remedies, courts must "act primar-
ily to effectuate the policy of... the Act."89 The Court explained that courts
exercising their inherent equitable powers must give effect to the statutory
purpose and the policy of Congress.' By allowing the Commission to seek
unrestricted restitution under Section 13(b), courts would undermine the
86. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64 (describing limitations on FTC's authority
to seek redress under Section 19).
87. See Federal Trade Commission Act § 19(e), 15 U.S.C. § 57(bXe) (1994) ("Remedies
provided in this section are in addition to, and not in lieu of any other remedy or right of action
provided by State or Federal law."). In addition, the legislative history of Section 19 clearly
indicates that Congress thought it was granting the Commission new authority. During debate
on Section 19, Senator Magnuson, the bill's sponsor, declared:
No longer will the... Commission be confined to slapping wrists of persons who
engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices and telling them not to do it again.
The bill authorizes the... Commission to not only bring a halt to unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices but also to go into court and ask a judge to order consumer
redress for those people who have been injured by such acts or practices.
120 CoNG. REc. 40,711-12 (remarks of Senator Magnuson). That the bill's chief sponsor
believed Congress was expanding the Commission's remedial authority when it enacted Sec-
tion 19 negates the argument made by the Singer court that Section 19(e), which provides that
"[nlothing in this section shall be construed to affect any authority of the Commission under
any other provision of law," 15 U.S.C. § 57(bXe), meant that relief provided in Section 13(b)
was notto be limited by Section 19. FTC v. U.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir.
1982).
88. See Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Further Support of Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss at 8, FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 1999) (Cv. 98-
03114) (noting that nothing in language or legislative history of statute indicates Congress
intended Section 19 relief to be duplicative); see also Ward, supra note 41, at 1192 (concluding
that "what Congress did so specifically in one section, it would not have left for implication in
another').
89. Porter, 328 U.S. at 400; see also Ward, supra note 41, at 1190 (noting that appliea-
tion of Porter doctrine requires that two criteria be met); Michael S. Kelly & Bilal Sayyed,
FTC's Quest for Money Damages: An Unauthorized Power Grab, LEGAL BACKGROUNMDE
(Washington Legal Foundation, Washington, D.C.), July 11, 1999, at 3 (same).
90. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 400 (1946) (noting that inherent
equitable power authorizes court "to decree restitution . . . to give effect to the policy of
Congress" (quoting Clark v. Smith, 39 U.S. (13 Pet) 195,203)).
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policy of the FTC Act that the Commission provide prospective guidance as
opposed to seeking redress for past wrongs. 1 As discussed above, Congress
reconciled the Commission's broad power to declare conduct illegal with the
need to provide notice by limiting the consequences of violating the FTC Act
to a cease-and-desist order. 2 Nothing in the language or legislative history of
Section 13(b) suggests that its enactment changed this policy against retroac-
tive relief.93 Moreover, when Congress authorized the Commission to seek
redress in Section 19, it responded to precisely the same concerns regarding
retroactive relief by allowing the Commission to seek redress only when a
reasonable person would have known that the conduct was dishonest or
fraudulent.
94
Thus, despite the apparent consensus among courts, Porter does not
necessarily support the holding in Singer that the Commission may seek resti-
tution under Section 13(b). Furthermore, inMylan, the Commission alleged
that the company had engaged in unfair methods of competition.9 Singer and
all of the cases in which courts have followed Singer involved unfair or
deceptive acts or practices, not unfair methods of competition.96 Thus, the
cases are distinguishable.
91. See 51 CoNo.REc. 13116(1914) (remarks ofSenatorNewlands). SenatorNewlands,
the principal sponsor of the Act, stated that Congress wanted "not to punish, but to secure
higher standards of conduct, by rules that will be laid down by this commission and sus-
tained by the court, and which will have an educational effect upon the commerce of the
country." Id.
92. See FTC v. Heater, 503 F.2d 321,324 (9th Cir. 1974) (asserting that cease-and-desist
authority does not empower Commission to seek retroactive relief); see also FTC v. Ruberoid
Co., 343 U.S. 470,473 (1952) ("Orders of the ... Commission are not intended to... exact
compensatory damages for past acts, but to prevent illegal practices in the future."); FTC v.
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 706 (1948) (asserting that purpose of Commission is "not to punish
or to fasten liability on respondents for past conduct but to ban specific practices for the future
in accordance with the general mandate of Congress").
93. See supra notes 57-59 (describing purpose for enacting Section 13(b)).
94. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (noting that Commission can seek
redress only when conduct violates rule or reasonable person would have known conduct was
"dishonest or fraudulent").
95. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, Federal Trade Commission v.
Mylan Labs., Inc., Cv. 98-3114 para. 18 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 21,1998), athttp'iwwwaft.gov/os/
1998/9812/mylancmp.htm.
96. See FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 24, 25 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (alleging
fraudulent scheme to sell business opportunities); see also FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 530 (7th
Cir. 1997) (charging unfair and deceptive practices in advertising, promoting, and selling work-
at-home opportunities and financial services); FTC v. Gem Merchandising, 87 F.3d 466, 467
(lth Cir. 1996) (alleging unfair practices in telemarketing medical alert devices); FTC v.
Security Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312,1313 (8th Cir. 1991) (alleging fraudulent
marketing of rare coins).
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B. In Antitrust Cases
Until Mylan, no court had considered whether the Commission could
seek equitable monetary relief in a case involving unfair methods of compe-
tition.' In concluding that the Commission could proceed with its claims
for restitution and disgorgement, the Mylan court relied upon the progeny
of Singer,s observing that "five courts of appeals and numerous district
courts have penmitted the FTC to pursue monetary relief under Section
13(b)... [b]ased on the principle of statutory construction set forth in Por-
ter." Cases involving unfair methods of competition (antitrust cases), how-
ever, raise additional questions about the Commission's authority to seek
restitution.
97. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4-5 (D.D.C. 1999) (order grant-
ing motion for reconsideration) (noting that "no court has addressed the specific issue of
restitution on behalf of indirect purchasers"). But see 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
supra note 7, at 604 (suggesting that one court has granted restitution in two antitrust
cases). In FTC v. Abbott Labs., 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCII) 69,996 (D.D.C. 1992) (Gesell,
J.), dismissed on other grounds, 853 F. Supp. 526 (D.D.C. 1994), the district court denied
a motion to dismiss the Commission's claims for a permanent injunction and restitu-
tion, noting that "[w]hether or not the Court should issue a permanent injunction and/or
order restitution must await trial." Id. at 69,996. In a subsequent ruling in the case, however,
the court said that "the FTC's prayer for restitution may prove to be beyond the Court's
equitable authority since the FTC seeks to vindicate the public interest, not to restore to the
agency its losses due to alleged misconduct" Id. at 70,087. The court seemed to draw
the distinction made infra Part II B, that is, quite apart from whether the Commission has
authority to seek restitution, it may not seek such a remedy on behalf of indirect purchasers
in an antitrust case. In any case, Abbott Labs. did not resolve the issue of whether the FTC
could seek restitution in an antitrust case. In American Home Products Corp., 5 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCII) 23,209 (D.D.C. June 11, 1992), two infant formula manufacturers agreed to
settle bid rigging charges. The settlement agreement required the companies to deliver 3.6
million pounds of infant formula to the Department of Agriculture. American Home Products
Corp., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 23,209 (D.D.C. June 11, 1992). Although the district court
was required to approve the settlement agreement, its approval does not constitute resolution
of any legal issues, including whether the Commission has authority to seek restitution in an
antitrust case.
98. See Mylan, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 4-5 (citing FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir.
1997); FTC v. Gem Merchandising, 87 F.3d 466,470 (1 lth Cir. 1996); FTC v. Patron, 33 F.3d
1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994); FTC v. Security Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1313
(8th Cir. 1991)).
99. FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25,37 (D.D.C. 1999). The court included
in its count the Fifth Circuit's decision in FTC v. Southwest Sunsites Inc., 665 F.2d 711 (5th
Cir. 1982). In that case, however, the Commission sought an asset freeze in conjunction with
a preliminary injunction. Southwest Sunsites, 665 F.2d at 714. The court granted the asset
freeze, reasoning that it would preserve the possibility of an action for consumer redress under
Section 19. Id. at 718. Thus, the Fifth Circuit has not held in Southwest Sunsites or any other
cast that the Commission may seek equitable monetary relief.
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1. "Necessary and Inescapable Inference"
The elaborate enforcement provisions for remedying antitrust violations
would seem to give rise to a "necessary and inescapable inference"'"1° that
Congress did not intend to authorize the Commission to recover equitable
monetary relief under Section 13(b). Recent Supreme Court precedent
indicates the Court will draw such an inference "where Congress has provided
'elaborate enforcement provisions' for remedying the violation of a federal
statrte."'O' In Meghrig v. KEC Western, Inc.,' 02 the Court concluded that
when elaborate remedial provisions are in place, "it cannot be assumed that
Congress intended to authorize by implication additional judicial remedies for
private citizens suing under the statute. 3
In antitrust cases, Congress has provided such "elaborate enforcement
provisions." As discussed above, under Section 13(b), the Commission may
ask a court to temporarily enjoin unfair methods of competition, and in
"proper cases" may also seek a permanent injunction.1°' The Commission also
100. Porter v. Warner, 328 U.S. 395,398 (1946).
101. Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479,487-88 (1996) (quoting Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981)); see also Mertens v.
Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 254 (1993) (declining to infer action for restitution because
"statute's carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme provide[d] strong evidence that Con-
gress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly").
102. 516 U.S. 479 (1996).
103. See Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479,488 (1996) (concluding that Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act does not permit recovery of prior cost of cleaning up toxic
waste). In Meghrig, the Supreme Court considered whether the citizen suit provision of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) permits the recovery of past costs
for toxic waste cleanup. 516 U.S. at 481. The plain language of the statute permits citizens to
seek a mandatory injunction that orders a responsible party to undertake cleanup, or a prohibi-
tory injunction that restrains further RCRA violations. Id. at 484. Because RCRA expressly
provides for these remedies, the Court concluded that the statute did not contemplate other
remedies, including the award of past cleanup costs. Id. Moreover, because RCRA permits a
party to bring suit only if the waste at issue "may present an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment," the Court concluded that the statute provides a remedy for present or future harms, but
not for past cleanup costs. Id. at 485-86. The Court rejected an argument by the Government,
as amicus, that had the suit been brought while the waste posed an imminent endangerment,
plaintiff could seek restitution. Id. at 487 (citing Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395
(1946) (holding that courts retain inherent authority to award any equitable remedy that
Congress had not expressly taken away from them)). "[W]here Congress has provided 'elabo-
rate enforcement provisions' for remedying the violation of a federal statute" the Court asserted,
"'it cannot be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by implication additional judicial
remedies for private citizens suing under' the statute." Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 487-88 (quoting
Middlesex County SewerageAuth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,14-15 (1981)).
Consequently, the Court concluded that RCRA does not permit a private party to recover the
costs of prior cleanup. Id. at 488.
104. Federal Trade Commission Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1994).
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may issue an administrative cease-and-desist order against those who engage
in unfair methods of competition.' For violations of cease-and-desist orders,
district courts may impose a civil penalty and "such other and further equita-
ble relief as they deem appropriate.""l°s The Department of Justice may seek
to enjoin violations ofthe Sherman and Clayton Acts.'0 The Department also
may seek other types of equitable relief, including preliminary injunctive
relief, divestiture, rescission, and forfeiture (but not monetary relief), "to
prevent and restrain" Sherman and Clayton Act violations."cs It may enter
consent decrees to end antitrust violations and seek fines for violations of such
decrees."° The Department also may seek criminal sanctions for clear, pur-
poseful antitrust violations,"' including imprisonment and fines as set out in
the United States Sentencing Commission's Sentencing Guidelines."' Fi-
nally, and perhaps most importantly, Section 4 of the Clayton Act gives the
United States, private plaintiffs, and state and local governments the right to
recover treble damages for injury to their "business or property" caused by an
antitrust violation.
112
In Meghig, the language of the statute at issue, the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA), provided for prospective relief; it permitted
private'citizens to seekto enjoin further violations ofthe Act when the contain-
105. Federal Trade CommissionAct § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1994).
106. Federal Trade CommissionAct § 5(), 15 U.S.C. § 45() (1994).
107. See Sherman Act §§ 1-7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994) (prohibiting contracts, combina-
tions, conspiracies in restraint of trade and monopolization); Clayton Act §§ 1-20, 15 U.s.C.
§§ 12-27 (1994) (barring price discrimination and mergers that lessen competition).
108. ClaytonAct § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1994).
109. ABA SECTION oFANTITrUST LAW, supra note 7, at 692-93.
110. Id. at662.
111. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571-3572 (1994) (setting out factors courts should considerwhen
imposing prison terms and fines).
112. ClaytonAct § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994); see also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405
U.S. 251,262 (1972) (holding that states could not recover damages asparenspatriae on behalf
of their citizens under Section 4). In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., the Supreme Court asserted
that the legislative history of Section 4 "makes it quite plain that the United States was autho-
rized to recover... only for those injuries suffered in its capacity as a consumer of goods and
services." 405 U.S. at 265. When Congress amended Section 4 in 1955 to permit the United
States to seek damages for injury to "its business or property," the Senate Committee Report on
the legislation noted that "[t]he United States is, of course, amply equipped with the criminal
and civil process with which to enforce the antitrust laws." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 84-422, at
3 (1955)). "The proposed legislation, quite properly, treats the United States solely as a buyer
of goods and permits the recovery of actual damages suffered." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 84-422,
at 3 (1955)). Moreover, nothing in the legislative history of Section 13(b) indicates Congress
intended to alter this remedial scheme limiting the extent to which the federal government could
seek monetary relief to damages to its own "business and property." See supra notes 54-59 and
accompanying text (discussing legislative history of Section 13(b)).
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ination at issue "may present an imminent and substantial endangermient." 113
Like the RCRA provision at issue in Meghrig, the language of Section 13(b)
provides for prospective reliet authorizing the Commission to seek injunctive
relief when a person "is violating, or is about to violate," the laws enforced by
the Commission." 4 Nonetheless, inMeghrig, as inMylan, the Government
invoked Porter in an effort to persuade the court to imply a remedy for a past
violation.' After examining the complex remedial schemes in RCRA and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA), the Supreme Court held that a private citizen could not seek
to recover the costs of past cleanup under RCRA.n 6 This holding suggests
that, given the "elaborate enforcement provisions""17 for remedying antitrust
violations, the Court might infer that Congress, by permitting the government
to obtain an injunction under Section 13(b), did not "intend[ ] to authorize by
implication"'1 additional remedies, including restitution and disgorgement." 9
The plaintiffs inMeghrig, however, could not seek an injunction because,
at the time of the suit, the contamination did not "present an imminent and
substantial endangerment.' 20 The Meghrig Court declined to decide whether
RCRA permitted private parties seeking an injunction to recover cleanup
113. Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(aXl)(B) (1994)).
114. Federal Trade Commission Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1994).
115. Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 487 (arguing as amicus curiae).
116. Id. at488.
117. Id. at487.
118. Id. at 488.
119. See also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) (holding that Clayton
Act did not permit states to sue for damages on behalf of their citizens for antitrust violations).
In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., the Supreme Court declined to read additional remedies into the
antitrust laws, asserting that Congress had particular purposes for enacting the remedies that it
did. 405 U.S. at 262. The Court asserted:
In enacting these laws, Congress had many means at its disposal to penalize vio-
lators. It could have, for example, required violators to compensate federal, state,
and local government for the estimated damage to their respective economies
caused by the violations. But, this remedy was not selected. Instead, Congress
chose to permit all persons to sue to recover three times their actual damages every
time they were injured in their business or property by an antitrust violation. By
offering potential litigants the prospect of a recovery in three times the amount of
their damages, Congress encouraged these persons to serve as "private attorneys
general."
Id. The Court further noted that it would "insist upon a clear expression of a congressional
purpose" before permitting additional remedies for antitrust violations. Id. at 264.
120. See Meghrig v. KFC W.,Inc., 516 U.S. 479,482 (1996) (reciting plaintiffs claim that
contamination had previously posed danger and that defendants were responsible for "equitable
restitution").
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costs that arise when contamination still presents an imminent and substantial
enge e. 2  In Mylan, by contrast, the Commission was seeking an
injunction, in addition to restitution and disgorgement, and thus was invoking
the equitable powers expressly provided for in the statute.'2 Thus, the ques-
tion of whether the Court, given the "elaborate enforcement provisions" for
remedying antitrust violations, would infer that Congress did not "intend[ ] to
authorize by implication" remedies not expressly provided for remains unan-
swered.'1
3
2. "The Policy of the Act"
Section 5 of the FTC Act contains the prohibition on unfair methods
of competition. 24 As noted above, Congress left it to the Commission and
the courts to determine what conduct constitutes unfair competition.2'5 The
Commission may proceed under Section 5 against violations of the Clayton,
Sherman, and Robinson-Patman Acts 26 (the antitrust laws).2 7 InMylan, for
example, the Commission alleged that Mylan had violated Section 5 by mon-
opolizing and conspiring to monopolize the markets for two of its drugs,1"
121. See id. at 488 (noting that Court had not "consider[ed] whether a private party could
seek to obtain an injunction requiring another party to pay cleanup costs which arise after a
RCRA citizen suit has been properly commenced").
122. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 32 (DD.C. 1999) (noting that
Commission sought "a permanent injunction and other relief').
123. See Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 487 (noting limited remedies provided in RCRA for private
parties to recover cleanup costs). In Porter, the Supreme Court asserted that where the public
interest was involved, a court's equitable power "assumes an even broader and more flexible
character than when only a private controversy is at stake." Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328
U.S. 395, 398 (1946). In Meghrig, the plaintiffs sought to recover cleanup costs in context of
private controversy, 516 U.S. at 481-82, whereas the Commission in Mlan asserted authority
to seek restitution in the public interest, 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 36-37. This distinction suggests
that, in Mylan, the Court might be less willing to conclude that Congress did not authorize
restitution by implication.
124. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5,15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1994).
125. See 51 CONG. REc. 13116 (1914) (remarks of Senator Newlands) (noting that "[the
C]ommission, and ultimately the courts, will be called upon to ... determin[e] what set of facts
and circumstances constitute unfair competition").
126. See Clayton Act § 2,15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994) (barring price discrimination).
127. See Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594,609 (1953) (finding
that Section 5 "registers violations of the Clayton and Sherman Acts"); FTC v. Motion Picture
Adver. Servs. Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 392, 395 (1953) (holding that conduct prohibited by Sherman
Act automatically violates Section 5); Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92, 99 (2d Cir. 1962)
(assuming discriminatory acts barred by Robinson-Patman also violate Section 5). Although
the FTC Act is a conduit through which the government may enforce the antitrust laws, given
its broader coverage, the Act is generally referred to as a consumerprotection statute.
128. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing charges against Mylan).
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conduct that also violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act.' Section 5 also
reaches conduct that conflicts with the policies of the antitrust laws even
though such conduct might not actually violate those laws.' ° For example,
the Commission may act to stop in its incipiency conduct that would violate
the antitrust laws only when full blown. 3
In exercising their inherent equitable powers, Porter directs courts to
give effect to the policies of the FTC Act and of Congress.132 Because the
prohibition on unfair methods of competition in Section 5 of the FTC Act
incorporates the antitrust laws and the spirit or policies represented by those
laws,133 the policy of the FTC Act encompasses the policies of those other
laws. Thus, in determining whether the policy of the FTC Act restricts the
authority of the Commission to seek restitution, courts also must take into
account the policies of the antitrust laws. 4
129. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Section 2 makes it a felony to "monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopo-
lize any part of the trade or commerce." Id.
130. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316,320-21 (1966) (holding that Commission
acted within its authority in declaring franchise program unfair whether or not it violated
antitrust laws); 1 ABAANTrrRusT SECTION, MONOGRAPHNO. 5, THE FTC As ANANTIIRUST
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY: THE ROlE OF SECTION5 OF THE FTC ACrIN ANTIRUST 40 (1981)
(describing FTC authority to proceed against conduct "contrary to the 'spirit' or 'policy' of the
antitrust laws as an unfair method of competition"); see also FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.,
257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922) (holding that resale price-maintenance scheme violated Section 5
despite absence of agreement required to prove Sherman Act § 1 violation). In Beech-Nut
Packing Co., the Supreme Court asserted that "[t]he Sherman Act is not involved here except
insofar as it shows a declaration of public policy." Id.
131. See Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467 (1941) ("[The]
purpose and object of this combination, its potential power, its tendency to monopoly, the
coercion it could and did practice upon a rival method of competition, all brought it within the
policy of the prohibition declared by the Sherman and Clayton Acts.").
132. See Porter v. Warner, 328 U.S. 395, 400 (1946) (concluding that court may order
restitution of excessive charges "in order to give effect to the policies of Congress").
133. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (explaining that FTC Act encompasses
policies and spirit of antitrust laws).
134. This inference draws on much the same reasoning that the district court in Mylan
employed in analyzing the effect that its interpretation of the FTC Act would have on interpreta-
tion of state Little FTC Acts. The court reasoned that because the state Little FTC Acts
prompted courts to follow federal law, they would permit the states to seek restitution as well.
FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1999) (order granting motion for
reconsideration). Here, interpretation of the FTC Act is guided by the antitrust laws, which
would bar restitution. See infra notes 151-206 and accompanying text (contending that restitu-
tion contravenes policies of antitrust laws); see also Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitu-
tion in theMississ'ppi Tobacco Settlement: DidSmoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REV. 847,
886 (1999) (discussing state's attempt to obtain restitution after several failed attempts to
recover under products liability). Rendleman explains that when a plaintiff seeks restitution
because he could not recover damages at law, the court must ask: If the court finds defendant
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For over twenty years, the Supreme Court's opinion inIllinois Brick has
stood as the policy ofthe antitrust laws with regard to who can recover money
for violations of those laws.' The plaintiffs in Illinois Brick were indirect
purchasers of concrete blocks, and they claimed that price fixing by the manu-
facturers had injured them because builders had passed the overcharges on to
them."6 They sought to recover under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 37 which
permits persons who are injured "in their business or property" by violations
of the antitrust laws to seek treble damages.' The Court held that direct
purchasers are injured to the full extent of the overcharge paid by them, and
thus the indirect-purchaser plaintiffs were not injured within the meaning of
the Clayton Act.
139
The Court offered three reasons for its conclusion. First, it was unwilling
to introduce additional complexity into antitrust suits by forcing courts to
determine the effect of the overcharge on the direct purchaser's decisions con-
cerning prices and whether the direct purchaser would have behaved differ-
ently absent the overcharge. 140 Second, allowing all the indirect purchasers
who purchased from a particular direct purchaser to recover would lead to
fewer antitrust suits because their stake in the recovery would be so small that
it would not provide an incentive to sue. 4'
Third, the Illinois Brick Court did not want to impose multiple liability
on defendants. In a previous case, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machin-
ery Corp.,42 the Court had rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiff
was not actually injured by an illegal overcharge because it had passed on the
overcharge to its customers. 43 The Hanover Shoe Court instead held that the
plaintiff had been injured by the full amount ofthe illegal overcharge, and, as
unjustly enriched and grants plaintiff restitution, would that undermine the reason to deny
recovery of damages at law? Rendleman, supra. The same question must be asked here: Ifra
court were to find an antitrust defendant unjustly enriched and granted the Commission restitu-
tion on behalf of indirect purchasers, would that undermine the reasons that indirect purchasers
are denied damages at law?
135. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726 (1977) (holding that only direct
purchasers can recover for violations ofantilrust laws).
136. Id.
137. Clayton Act § 4,15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
138. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726-27.
139. Id. at 746.
140. Id. at 492-93.
141. Id. at494.
142. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
143. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968)
(holding that direct purchasers are injured by full amount of illegal overcharge paid by them
and that antitrust defendant may not raise defense that overcharge was passed on to indirect
purchasers).
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a result, the defendant could not avoid liability by showing that plaintiff had
passed on the overcharge." Because Hanover Shoe already prevented a
defendant from avoiding liability by showing that a direct-purchaser plaintiff
had passed on an illegal overcharge to its customers, the Illinois Brick Court
did not want to adopt a rule permitting indirect-purchaser plaintiffs to estab-
lish liability by proving that a direct purchaser had passed on an illegal
overcharge to therm.'45 Such a rule would impose multiple liability on defen-
dants, making them liable to both indirect and direct purchasers.' 46 Once
indirect purchasers had recovered some or all of the overcharge passed on to
them, direct purchasers still would be permitted to recover the full amount of
the overcharge because, under Hanover Shoe, a defendant could not shoiv that
they had passed it on to their customers, the indirect purchasers.
Because the Ilinois Brick Court acceptedthe reasoning of Hanover Shoe,
it declined to overrule the case. 47 Furthermore, the Court reasoned, even if
direct and indirect purchasers asserted claims only for the portion of the
overcharge that they absorbed, inconsistent judgments could still impose
multiple liability on the defendant.'48 Thus, the Court held that direct purchas-
ers sustain injury to the full extent of any overcharge paid by them. 49 As a
result, indirect purchasers do not suffer injury within the meaning of Section
4 and cannot recover damages by proving that a direct purchaser has passed
on an overcharge to them.50
a. "Avoid Multiple Liability"
Although the plaintiffi in Illinois Brick sought damages under Section 4
of the Clayton Act,M the Court's reasons for barring indirect purchasers from
seeking damages applies equally to an award of restitution.' In Illinois
144. Id.
145. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,730-32 n.11 (1977) ('We do not find
this risk acceptable.").
146. See id. at 730 (noting as well that "following an automatic recovery of the ful over-
charge by the direct purchaser, the indirect purchaser could sue to recover the same amount").
147. See id. at 729 (declining to abandon Hanover Shoe).
148. See id. at 738 n.18 (noting that possibly inconsistent judgments obtained by con-
flicting claimants remain nonetheless).
149. Id. at 746.
150. Id.
151. Id.at726-27.
152. See supra note 11 (discussing differences between damages and restitution); see also
Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 284 (1985) (holding that obligation under injunction to clean
up hazardous waste was dischargeable in bankruptcy just as money damages would have been).
In Ohio v. Kovacs, the Supreme Court concluded that an injunctive obligation costing money
was largely equivalent to a money obligation that would be discharged. Id. at 284; see also 1
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Brick, the Court declined to allow indirect purchasers to recover because it
would create a serious risk of multiple liability for the defendant." InMlan,
the district court permitted the Commission to seek restitution for the full
amount of the illegal overcharge.' Notwithstanding what the Commission
recovers in its suit for restitution, direct purchasers may still sue for treble
damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act for the full amount of the over-
charge.'15  Indeed, over twenty private plaintiffs have filed suit against
Mylan. ss Were the Commission and direct purchasers to recover overlapping
amounts of the overcharge, the former in restitution and the latter in damages,
defendants would face multiple liability.
As a general rule, multiple liability for the same wrongful act is not
permitted even where two different types of remedies are claimed."5 7 For
example, in his noted treatise, Law of Remedies, Dobbs noted:
[R]estitution may not be combined with damages if the combination will
produce an excess recovery. The familiar principle of damages law is that
the remedyshould notprovide more than one full compensation. The anal-
DoBBs, supra note 11, § 1.8, at 35 (noting that "[r]emedial equivalence may be ground for
denying one remedy if its equivalent would be denied").
153. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730-32 (1977) ("[W]e are unwilling
to open the door to duplicative recoveries." (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251,
264(1972))).
154. FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25,36-37 (D.D.C. 1999).
155. ClaytonAct § 4,15 U.S.C. § 15(1994). Section4 provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost
of suit, including a reasonable attorneys fee.
Id.
156. See Kelly & Sayyed, supra note 89, at 4 (noting approximately 20 private antitrust
suits pending inMylan case).
157. See l DOBBS, supra note 11, § 3.3(7), at 316 (asserting that "[w]hen more than one
basic remedy is used, care must be taken to avoid excessive or duplicative relief'). Dobbs notes
that "two different measures [of recovery] should not be used to compensate for the same
underlying loss, even though the two measures produce different figures or used different
calculations." Id. at 316; see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974) (asserting that
restitution "is in practical effect indistinguishable in many aspects from an award of damages");
Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742,748 (7th Cir. 1988) (denying restitution and
damages for same injury); supra note 11 (distinguishing between restitution and damages).
Moreover, the court's power to order restitution extends only to the amount by which the
defendant profited from his wrongdoing because any further sum would constitute a penalty.
SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325,1335 (5th Cir. 1978). The purposes of the FTC Act do not include
punishment. See Federal Trade Commission Act § 5,15 U.S.C. § 45(aX2) (1994) ("The Com-
mission is empowered and directed to prevent persons ... from using unfair methods of
competition.. . ." (emphasis added)).
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ogous principle of restitution law is that restitution should not force dis-
gorgement of more than the unjust enrichment If the two remedies are to
be combined... those limitingprinciples require thatthe combined recov-
ery must not exceed the greater of (a) full compensation or (b) full dis-
gorgement, s
The Mylan court itself acknowledged this principle when it dismissed a
separate claim by the states for equitable monetary relief under the Clayton
Act.159 The court concluded that permitting disgorgement when damages are
also available risks multiple liability.1' The court noted:
While disgorgement would have the additional benefit of permitting the
States to compensate indirect purchasers who are excluded from recovery
under currentlaw, the Supreme Court [inllinoisBrick] weighedthis inter-
est against the threat of duplicative recovery and determined that only
direct purchasers have standing under the Clayton Act. 6
In expressly rejecting multiple liability for antitrust defendants, the
illinois Brick Court relied upon its Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. 
62 opinion. 6 3
In that case, the State of Hawaii sought damages and an injunction as parens
patriae on behalf of its citizens for injury to the state's economy.'6 The
Supreme Court concluded that were it to hold that Congress intended for the
state to recover damages for injury to its economy, it would open the door to
multiple liability for defendants.165 The Court noted that damages in a suit
under Section 4 are established by the amount of the overcharge." Courts
will not go beyond the fact of this injury to determine whether victims of the
overcharge have partially recouped their losses in some other way, such as a
suit brought by the state. 67 In other words, if a state had already recovered for
158. 1 DOBBs, supra note 11, § 4.5(5), at 654.
159. See Mylan, 62 F. Supp. at 25, 42 (dismissing states' claims for restitution and
disgorgement under Clayton Act § 16). Section 16 of the Clayton Act permits any person,
including a state, "to sue for and have injunctive relief... against threatened loss or damage by
a violation ofthe antitrust laws." Clayton Act § 16,15 U.S.C. § 26 (1994).
160. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 41 (D.D.C. 1999) (noting that
disgorgement "raise[s] the specter of duplicative recoveries").
161. Id.
162. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
163. See Illinois Brick Co. v. illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 731 (1977) ("As in Hawaii v. Stan-
dard Oil Co.,. . .we are unwilling to 'open the door to duplicative recoveries.'").
164. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,405 U.S. 251,254-55 (1972).
165. Id. at263-64.
166. Id. at262 n.14.
167. See id. (citing Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 489
(1968) (holding that antitrust defendants could not defend by claiming plaintiff had passed on
overcharge to customers)).
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damage to its citizenry, the state's citizens still could recover individually for
those same damages because, under Hanover Shoe and illinois Brick, the
defendant could not raise as a defense the fact that the state had already recov-
ered on their behalf.'68
The claim for restitution by the Commission in Mylan is in many ways
the same as that made by the State of Hawaii. The restitution sought by the
Commission is "no more than a reflection of injuries to the 'business or prop-
erty"' of private parties, for which they may recover themselves under Section
4.169 Were the Commission to recover restitution for the full amount of the
overcharge, direct purchasers still could recover damages for the same over-
charge."7' Thus, the court in Mylan has opened the door to multiple liability,
a result Illinois Brick squarely rejected. 1'
b. "Avoid Complexity"
If multiple liability is to be avoided, any restitution recovered by the
Commission would have to be adjusted for claims by direct purchasers for
damages under Section 4.1"7 Moreover, if the Commission permits indirect
168. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481,489 (1968).
169. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 265. It has been suggested that the Commis-
sion should seek restitution where victims are unlikely to "recover themselves." See Andrew
J. Strenio, Jr., Why Thirteen Should Be a Lucky Number for Victims of lrce-Fixing, 57
ANrrRUST L.J. 149,155 (1988) (suggesting that Commission would consider ability of victims
to help themselves in deciding when to seek restitution); Kelly & Sayyed, supra note 89, at 4
(noting that Commission would only seek restitution where likelihood of successful private suits
is low). In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., however, the State of Hawaii made a similar argument
that it should be allowed to sue as parens patriae because the costs and other burdens of
protracted litigation would render private parties impotent to bring damages actions. Hawaii
v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251,265-66 (1972). The Court responded:
Private Parties are not as powerless, however, as the State suggests. Congress
has given private citizens rights of action for injunctive relief and damages for
antitrust violations without regard to the amount in controversy. Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provides for class actions that may enhance the efficacy of
private actions by permitting citizens to combine their limited resources to
achieve a more powerful litigation posture.... The fact that a successful
antitrust suit for damages recovers not only the costs of litigation, but also
attorney's fees, should provide no scarcity of members of the Bar to aid prospec-
tive plaintiff'in bringing these suits.
Id.
170. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text (noting that Mylan court admitted
equitable monetary relief would raise specter of multiple liability).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 146-47 (explaining Court's rejection of multiple
liability in Illinois Brick).
172. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,737 (1977) (asserting that court would
have to allocate overcharge among all potential claimants if indirect purchasers were permitted
to recover).
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purchasers to assert claims to any overcharges that it recovers, courts would
have to reconcile the claims of direct and indirect purchasers. 73 In such a
situation, direct purchasers, in private damages suits, and the Commission, on
behalf of indirect purchasers, are in a position to assert conflicting claims to
the overcharge by contending that overlapping amounts were absorbed at a
particular level in the distribution chain. 7
4
In Porter, the Supreme Court anticipated such a conundrum when it
considered whether the Price Control Administrator could seek restitution for
rent overcharges although tenants also had a private cause of action.175 The
Court concluded, however, that "[s]hould there appear to be conflicting claims
and counterclaims.. . the court has inherent power to bring in all the inter-
ested parties and settle the controversies or to retain the case until the matters
are otherwise litigated."' 7 It noted that even "persons not originally con-
nected with the litigation may be brought before the court so that their rights
in the subject matter may be determined and enforced.'
1 77
In illinois Brick, however, the Court considered the possibility that use
of compulsory joinder and interpleader - procedures very similar to that
advocated in Porter - could resolve conflicting claims to a common fumd in
an antitrust case. 7 ' The Court concluded that even if courts could find a way
to bring all potential parties together in one huge action, the resulting com-
plexity argued strongly for barring recovery by indirect purchasers. 179 Show-
ing that a direct purchaser had passed on an overcharge would require "at-
tempts to trace the effects of the overcharge on the purchaser's prices, sales,
costs, and profits, and... showing that these variables would have behaved
differently without the overcharge."'80 The uncertainties and difficulties in-
173. See Ronald W. DavisIndirectPurchaserLtigation: ARC America's Chickens Come
Home to Roost on the Illinois Brick Wall, 65 ANITRUST L.J. 375,397 (1999Xasserting that "as
a matter of logic," avoiding duplicative liability would require direct purchaser to share recovery
with indirect purchaser); see also Kelly & Sayyed, supra note 89, at 4 (noting approximately
20 private antitrust suits pending inMylan ease).
174. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 737 (noting that potential plaintiffs at each level of dis-
tribution chain could assert conflicting claims to overcharge).
175. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395,398 (1946) (noting that court "may
act so as to adjust and reconcile competing claims and so as to accord full justice to all the real
parties in interest").
176. Id. at403.
177. Id. at 398.
178. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 737 (1977) (recognizing need for
compulsory joinder and interpleader in absence of Hanover Shoe rule).
179. Id.at731n.ll.
180. See id. at 725 (quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S.
481,492-93 (1968)); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Pur-
chasers Have Standing to Sue Under theAntiftstLaws? An EconomicAnatysis of the Rule of
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volved in determining whether and how much of an illegal overcharge a direct
purchaser passed on to its customers led the Court in Illinois Brick to bar
indirect purchasers from recovering damages.18'
In Mylan, reconciling the competing claims of direct and indirect pur-
chasers to restitution obtained by the Commission would require both sets of
claimants to present to the court evidence showing the extent to which, if at
all, direct purchasers had passed on the illegal overcharge to indirect purchas-
ers.' 82 Such proof would introduce into antitrust cases precisely the type of
complexity that Illinois Brick sought to prevent."e Furthermore, the proce-
dure advocated in Porter would turn cases in which the Commission sought
restitution into "massive efforts to apportion recovery" among all purchasers
who could have absorbed part of the overcharge, a result that Illinois Brick
expressly rejected.1
8 4
Even were the Commission to retain the disgorged overcharge rather than
trying to distribute it to indirect purchasers, 185 this would not solve the prob-
lem of apportioning recovery to direct purchasers.'86 While the Commission
can only seek restitution of the amount of the overcharge, direct purchasers
Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHL L. REV. 602, 615-25 (1979) (providing classic analysis of mechanics
of apportioning antitrust overcharge among multiple levels of distribution). But see Robert 0.
Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing On the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive
PolicyAnaysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269,274 (1979) (countering Landes and Posner by arguing
extent of passing on is high and businesses employ one of two methods of pricing).
181. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 731.
182. See George J. Benston, Indirect Purchasers' Standing to Claim Damages in Price
Fixing Antitrust Actions: A Benefit/Cost Analysis of Proposals to Change the Illinois Brick
Rule, 55 ANTIRrUST LJ. 213, 220 (1986) (observing that such action must include assessment
of amount of overcharge parties incurred).
183. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 731-32 (noting that principal basis for Hanover Shoe
decision was complexity it would introduce into antitrust cases).
184. Id. at732.
185. There appears to be some question about whether the Commission would be permitted
to decide not to distribute funds. The Court in Illinois Brick noted that the Clayton Actparens
patriae provision permits recovered funds to be deposited with the state as general revenues. Id.
at 747 n31. "That Congress chose to provide such innovative methods of distributing damages
awarded inparenspatriae action," the Court observed, "does not eliminate the obstacles to com-
pensating indirect purchasers [in other types of suits]." Id.; see Citronelle-Mobile Gathering,
Inc., v. Edwards, 669 F.2d 717,723 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982) (concluding that "the Govern-
ment has a duty to try to ascertain those overcharged, and refund them, with interest, from the
restitution funds"). But see United States v. Exxon Corp., 561 F. Supp. 816, 855 (D.D.C. 1983)
(distinguishing Citronelle on its facts and concluding that when identification of victims is
impossible court may order defendant to make restitution to Treasury).
186. See Davis, supra note 173, at 399 (noting that government can eliminate difficulty
and cost of identifying injured consumers but still must distribute damages to indirect pur-
chasers).
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are entitled to receive trebled damages from violators.'" In addition, a direct
purchaser is entitled to claim damages for a reduction in the volume of its
sales caused by higher prices it charged in response to the overcharge. 8" It
seems likely that direct purchasers would have to undertake separate litigation
under Section 4 to obtain these additional damages." 9
c. "Do Not Discourage Private Suits"
The concern in Illinois Brick for injecting complexity into antitrust suits
by permitting indirect purchasers to introduce evidence that direct purchasers
had passed on an overcharge to them was prompted in part by concern that
increased complexity would deter antitrust suits."r Apportioning recovery
among direct and indirect purchasers would inject extremely complex issues
into a case, increasing the costs of recovery.' It also would create uncer-
tainty about how the overcharge would be apportioned."9 Increased costs and
uncertainty, the Illinois Brick Court concluded, would substantially reduce the
incentives to sue. 93 Moreover, apportionment would reduce the recovery
afforded to direct purchasers.9 At the same time, the small recovery at stake
for each indirect purchaser would not offset the reduced incentive of direct
purchasers to sue. 95
187. See Clayton Act § 4,15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994) (any person injured "shall recover three-
fold the damages by him sustained").
188. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 733 n.13 (1977) (noting that "even
if the defendant shows that as a result of the overcharge the direct purchaser increased its price
by the full amount of the overcharge, direct purchaser may still claim injury from a reduction
in the volume of its sales caused by its higher prices").
189. See Federal Trade CommissionAct § 5,15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994) (empowering Commis-
sion to "prevent persons... from using unfair methods of competition"). Because Section 5
provides no private cause of action for violations of its prohibitions, Holloway v. Bristol-Myers
Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1973), direct purchasers presumably would have to
separately prove a violation of the Sherman Act in order to receive these additional damages.
See Strenio, supra note 169, at 155 (suggesting that private plaintiffs would have to bring their
own lawsuit).
190. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 745 (noting Court's concern that complexity would





195. See id. (concluding that small stake indirect purchasers would have in outcome of suit
would reduce effectiveness of antitrust suits); see also Landes & Posner, supra note 180, at 615
(concluding that indirect purchaser suit necessarily weakens incentive of direct purchaser to sue
by reducing his recovery).
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The Court's desire to preserve incentives to sue was premised on the
assumption that the threat of antitrust suits deters antitrust violations."9 The
Court reasoned that adhering to '1he longstanding policy of encouraging
vigorous private enforcement of the antitrust laws" meant sparing direct
purchasers the burden of litigating the complexities of indirect purchaser
claims and permitting them to recover the full amount of the overcharge. 97
It concluded that 'the legislative purpose in creating a group of 'private
attorneys general' to enforce the antitrust laws... is better served by holding
direct purchasers to be injured to the full extent of the overcharge paid by
them. 11s1
Allowing the Commission to seek restitution, particularly since it does
so on behalf of indirect purchasers, would increase the costs and uncertainty
of proving damages for direct purchasers.1' As a consequence, the incentives
for direct purchasers to sue would decrease.2" On the other hand, the Com-
mission certainly would be a more efficient plaintiff than a multitude of
indirect purchasers. 2 1 However, government suits for restitution probably
would be infrequent relative to private antitrust suits. 2 2 Moreover, the threat
of trebled damages is much greater than the single overcharge that can be
recovered in a suit for restitution. 2 3 These factors suggest that the Commis-
196. See llinoisBrick, 431 U.S. at 745 (noting that increasing costs and diffusing benefits
of private antitrust actions would impair "important weapon of antitrust enforcement").
197. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745-46 (1977); see Porter v. Warner
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 401 (1946) (noting that equity courts should be responsive to
"statutorypolicy" (emphasis added)).
198. linoisBrick, 431 U.S. at 746; see Porter, 328 U.S. at 400 (1946) (suggesting restitu-
tion is appropriate "to give effect to [the Act's] purposes" (emphasis added)).
199. The Commission, by going to court, substantially has reduced the direct purchaser's
burden of proving liability. See Edward A. Snyder, EfficientAssignment of Rights to Sue for
AntitrustDamages,28 J.L. &ECON. 469 (1985) (including presence of government enforcement
action as' factor explaining number of private antitrust suits initiated). Of course, the direct
purchaser's burden would be lightened similarly were the Commission limited to seeking a
permanent injunction.
200. llfinoisBrick,431 U.S. at 745.
201. See Benston, supra note 182, at 226-230 (discussing benefits as well as costs of simi-
lar situation in which state sues inparenspatriae on behalf of indirect purchasers).
202. See Strenio, supra note 169, at 152 (suggesting that shortage of resources would limit
extent to which Commission could seek restitution); see also FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 5 n.2 (D.D.C. 1999) (noting that no court had ever addressed issue of restitution on
behalf of indirect purchasers); FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25,41 (D.D.C. 1999)
(concluding that government cannot seek restitution under Clayton Act).
203. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994) (permitting persons injured in their
business or property to seek "threefold" their damages); supra note 158 and accompanying
text (asserting that "restitution should not force disgorgement of more than the unjust enrich-
ment").
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sion should not be permitted to seek restitution at the cost of reducing the
incentives for direct purchasers to sue.
Thus, allowing the Commission to seek restitution in an antitrust case on
behalf of indirect purchasers would contravene all three ofthe policies that the
Supreme Court ascribed to the antitrust laws in Illinois Brick.2 ') In Illinois
Brick, the Court concluded that the antitrust laws should be interpreted to
avoid imposing multiple liability and injecting complexity into antitrust cases,
as well as to preserve the incentives for antitrust victims to sue."° In Porter,
the Court exhorted courts of equity that, in exercising their inherent equitable
powers, they should give effect to the policy and purposes of the statut. 2 °
Were courts to give effect to the policy and purposes of the FTC Act, which
incorporates the policies of the antitrust laws, they would not permit the
Commission to seek restitution in antitrust cases.
HI. Implications for Enforcement of State Antitrust Laws
Twelve years after llinois Brick, the Supreme Court in California v. ARC
America Corp.2"7 held that Illinois Brick did not preempt states from permit-
ting indirect purchasers to recover for violations of state antitrust law. °
204. Sgee supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text (discussing policies of antitrust law
identified in Illinois Brick).
205. See supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text (discussing policies of antitrust law
identified in Illinois Brick).
206. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 400 (1946) (asserting that courts
must frame remedies to effectuate policy ofAct).
207. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
208. See California v. ARC AmL Corp.,490 U.S. 93,101 (1989) (holdingthat state indirect
purchaser laws are not preempted by federal antitrust laws). In ARC America, the Supreme
Court considered whether the rule limiting federal antitrust recoveries to direct purchasers
preempts states from permitting indirect purchasers to recover under state antitrust laws. Id. at
100. The Court first concluded that Congress had not expressly preempted state law, nor had
it occupied the field. Id. at 101. Second, because Congress intended the federal antitrust
statutes to supplement state antitrust statutes, not displace them, federal antitrust laws generally
do not preempt state antitrust law. Id. at 102. The Court reasoned that because many state
indirect purchaser claims would be brought in state court, and because federal courts have
discretion to decline exercise of pendent jurisdiction over state indirect purchaser claims, any
complexity introduced into federal direct purchaser actions would be minimal. Id. at 104. The
Court also concluded that claims under state statutes will not reduce the incentives of direct
purchasers to bring private federal antitrust actions by reducing their potential recoveries. Id.
at 104-05. Finally, the Court rejected the Circuit Court's contention that state indirect purchaser
claims would impose multiple liability rejected by Illinois Brick, noting that state causes of
action are not preempted solely because they impose liability over and above that authorized
by federal law. Id. at 105. Because state laws permitting indirect purchaser recoveries do not
impede Congressional objectives identified inIllinois Brick, the Court concluded that such laws
are not preempted by federal anitrust law. Id. at 105-06.
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SinceARCAmerica, some state legislatures have enacted legislation expressly
permitting indirect purchasers to recover."° One state permitted onlythe state
attorney general to recover on behalf of indirect purchasers.21 0 In states where
no such legislation had been passed, most state appellate courts that have
addressed the question have followed Illinois Brick and decided that state
statutes barred indirect purchasers from recovering.2 ' In many states, neither
the legislature nor the courts have addressed the question of whether indirect
purchasers are permitted to recover. 2
InMylan, the court initially barred claims by states on behalf of indirect
purchasers unless the state statutes specifically permitted recovery for in-
direct purchasers."' The court reasoned that because federal antitrust law
bars damages claims by or on behalf of indirect purchasers, and because
each of the state statutes or case law interpreting such statutes required or
prompted courts to follow federal law in interpreting state antitrust law, the
state could not recover on behalf of indirect purchasers unless specifically
permitted to do so by state law.214 The court extended this reasoning to deny
209. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (West 1997) (permitting any person
injured to bring action, "regardless of whether such injured person dealt directly or indirectly
with the defendant"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4509(a) (1981) ("Any indirect purchaser in the
chain of manufacture... shall be deemed to be injured within the meaning of this chapter");
MiNN. STAT. § 325D.57 (1995) (permitting any person "injured directly or indirectly" to recover
damages); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-3 (Michie 1978) (allowing any person injured directly
or indirectly to bring action); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 37-1-33 (Mlichie 1994) (preserving
right to sue for person injured directly or indirectly); Wis. STAT. § 133.18 (1989) (permitting
any person injured directly or indirectly to recover). Other states had indirect purchaser
remedies which pre-dated the decision in Illinois Brick. See MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-21-9 (1972)
(permitting any person injured by direct or indirect effects of trust or combination to recover
damages).
210. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10/7(2) (West 1993) (permitting only state Attorney
General to bring indirect purchaser class action).
211. See, e.g., Blewett v. Abbott Labs., 938 P.2d 842, 845-46 (Wash. Ct App. 1997)
(following Illinois Brick in holding that indirect purchasers cannot recover under state antitrust
law); Stifflear v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 931 P.2d 471, 475-76 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that indirect purchasers lack standing to sue for damages or injunctive relief under state
antitrust law). But see Hyde v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 473 S.E.2d 680, 685-86 (N.C. 1996) (holding
that indirect purchaser may sue under state antitrust law).
212. See 3 ABAANTIRUSTSECIION, STATEANTrR USTPRACTICEANDSTATUTES, 37-35
(2d ed. 1999) (noting that Ohio courts have not yet addressed limitation on standing set forth
in Illinois Brick); id. at 38-17 (noting that Oklahoma has no indirect purchaser statute); id. at
47-17 (noting that Utah has not enacted indirect purchaser statute and no Utah cases construe
Illinois Brick indirect purchaser doctrine).
213. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 43 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding that
"unless a state has specifically instituted a right of action for indirect purchasers, that state
cannot sue on behalf ofindirect purchasers").
214. See id. (citing Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977)).
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claims by states for restitution and disgorgement on behalf of indirect pur-
chasers.
215
The Mylan court departed from this reasoning in addressing the claims
of Idaho. The court dismissed Idaho's claim for damages on behalf of indirect
purchasers under the Idaho Antitrust Law because neither the statute nor case
law interpreting that statute permitted recovery by indirect purchasers, and
because interpretation of Idaho antitrust law is guided by fderal law.
2 16
However, the court permitted Idaho to assert claims for restitution and dis-
gorgement on behalf of indirect purchasers under the Idaho Consumer Protec-
tion Act, the state's Little FTC Act.2 7 The court noted that Idaho law gives
great weight to the Federal Trade Commission's interpretation of the FTC Act
in construing Idaho's Consumer Protection Act.21 Because it had found that
the FTC Act authorizes equitable monetary relief, the court reasoned, it would
permit Idaho to assert similar claims under its Little FTC Act.219
This ruling prompted several states to seek reconsideration of their
claims for equitable monetary relief on behalf of indirect purchasers under
their Little FTC Acts.2 The court granted this motion with regard to fourteen
states.221 Based on its holding that the Federal Trade Commission could seek
equitable monetary remedies, the court permitted states with Little FTC Acts
that prompt courts to consider the FTC Act when interpreting those state
statutes to seek restitution on behalf of indirect purchasers.'m The court also
allowed states with consumer protection acts, the structure and purpose of
215. See id. (denying restitution claims because providing monetary relief to indirect pur-
chasers increases risk of duplicative recovery).
216. See id. at46 (citing Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 646 P.2d 988, 994 n.11 (Idaho
1982) (noting that interpretations of federal law are persuasive in interpreting Idaho statute)).
217. Id. at 48; see supra note 7 (explaining terminology used to refer to state consumer
protection laws).
218. Id. at48 (citing IDAHO CODE § 48-604(a) (1998)).
219. Id.
220. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1999) (order granting
motion for reconsideration) (observing that states were correct in noting internal inconsistency
in court's opinion).
221. See id. at 6-16 (granting motion with regard to Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah,
Vermont, and West Virginia).
222. Most of these statutes give deference specifically to interpretations of Section 5 of the
FTC Act, the substantive provision of the Act making "unfair methods of competition" unlaw-
ful. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). In Myan, the court essentially concludes that Section 5 imports
the remedial provisions it has read into Section 13(b) into the state Little FTC Acts. As
observed supra note 134, the court appears somewhat inconsistent in contending that Section
5 does not import the restrictions on remedies available to indirect purchasers encompassed in
the federal antitrust laws.
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which suggest that they should be interpreted in light of the FTC Act, to assert
equitable claims on behalf of indirect purchasers.? Finally, the court also
permitted states with statutes that permitted the state to proceed in equity
to seek such relief even though the statutes did not explicitly reference the
FTC Act.Y
State laws enacted pursuantto ARCAmerica permitting indirect purchas-
ers to recover for violations of state antitrust laws have had the benefit of
compensating indirect purchasers. States that have enacted such laws, how-
ever, have confronted many of the problems that the Court in Illinois Brick
anticipated. Injury among indirect purchasers often is widely dispersed and
individual claims often are relatively small, making indirect purchaser claims
well suited for class actions.' State courts usually find that indirect purchas-
ers do not meet the requirements for class certification.2 6 This fact appears
to reflect the magnitude ofthe difficulty and cost of proving injury to indirect
purchasers, the very problems Illinois Brick foresaw.' State laws permitting
indirect purchasers to recover also have presented problems in the context of
the dual state-federal system of antitrust enforcement permitted by ARC
America. Under illinois Brick, direct purchasers may sue in federal court for
the full amount of an illegal overcharge, whether or not they passed on the
overcharge to their customers." At the same time, indirect purchasers suing
in state court also may recover a portion of the overcharge, ' leaving states
with the question of whether to impose multiple liability on defendants or to
allow them to argue that they are not liable for any portion of an overcharge
that direct purchasers passed on."
If the decision in Mylan stands, it may, in effect, foist these quandaries
on states that do not have statutes permitting indirect purchasers to recover for
223. Mylan, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 5.
224. Id.
225. See William R- Page, The Limits of State Indirect Purchaser Suits: Class Certifica-
tion in the Shadow ofIllinois Brick, 67 ANTrnRUST L.. 1, 3 (1999) (noting that indirect pur-
chaser statutes now provide fora in which classes of indirect purchasers can challenge national
price-fixing conspiracies).
226. See id. at 5 (noting that most state courts have concluded that issues in common to
indirect purchaser classes did not predominate over individual issues).
227. See id. (arguing that results in indirect purchaser class actions confirm magnitude of
problems of proof referred to in lllinois Brick).
228. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,746 (1977) (holding direct purchasers
to be injured to full extent of overcharge paid by them).
229. See Davis, supra note 173, at 376 (noting that state indirect purchaser class actions
often follow in wake of federal direct purchaser suits).
230. See id. at 380 (noting that some state court decisions suggest defendant may not raise
defense).
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state antitrust violations. Moreover, the decision may create inconsistencies
in some states between state antitrust laws and state Little FTC Acts. Many
state antitrust laws bar indirect purchasers from recovering for antitrust viola-
tions,"' but Mylan would permit recovery by indirect purchasers under state
Little FTC Acts for the very same illegal conduct. 2 The case of Connecticut,
one of the states that the court permitted to seek restitution on behalf of
indirect purchasers, is illustrative. 3 The Connecticut Antitrust Act contains
no express provision indicating the extent to which a defendant's liability for
antitrust overcharges extends to indirect purchasers, and Connecticut courts
have not yet passed on this issue."3 Because the Connecticut Antitrust Act
directs that interpretations given by federal courts to federal antitrust statutes
should guide courts in construing its provisions, 5 it is likely that courts
applying Connecticut law would follow Illinois Brick and bar indirect pur-
chasers from recovering for violations of the Connecticut statute."s More-
over, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has held that the Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), the state's Little FTC Act, requires privity
between plaintiff and defendant in private suits,237 in effect barring indirect
231. See supra note 211 (citing some states that bar indirect purchasers from recovering
under state antitrust laws).
232. Cf Mackv. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So. 2d 100,101 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1996)
(holding that Florida's Deceptive Trade Practices Act permitted indirect purchasers to recover
damages though state antitrust law barred such recovery). While a state antitrust law barring
indirect purchaser recovery would be inconsistent with a Little FTC Act that permitted indirect
purchasers to recover for antitrust violations, they would not necessarily be incompatible. See
id. at 110 (finding "no plain inconsistency or repugnancy" between Florida Little FTC Act and
Antitrust Act).
233. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1999) (order granting
motion for reconsideration) (reinstating state's claim for restitution on behalf of indirect
purchasers).
234. 1 ABAANTTrUST SECTION, supra note 7, at 8-18.
235. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 35-44b (1997) ("It is the intent ofthe general assembly...
that courts of this state shall be guided by interpretations given by the federal courts to federal
antitrust statutes.").
236. 1 ABAANTIIaUST SECTION, STATEANTITRUST PRACTICE AND STATUTES, 8-18 (2d
ed. 1999). In addition, the provision creating a private right of action for violations of the Act
a plaintiff suing to be "injured in its business or property," CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 35-35 (1997),
language which parallels Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994). illinois Brick
held that indirect purchasers were not injured within the meaning of Section 4. Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977). The provision granting the state authority to recover
asparenspatriae on behalf of its citizens, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-32, also parallels the Clayton
Act'sparenspariae provision, Clayton Act § 4,15 U.S.C. § 15c, which the Supreme Court has
held does not permit states to recover on behalf of indirect purchasers. Kansas v. Utilicorp
United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199,219 (1990).
237. See Waterbury Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. Canaan Oil and Fuel Co., 477 A.2d 988,
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purchasers from recovering damages or equitable relief under that provision
of CUTPA." 8 The court so held despite CUPTA's deference clause, which
directs that interpretations of Section 5 ofthe FTC Act should guide courts in
construing CUTPA. 9 The court inMylan, however, relied upon the defer-
ence clause in permitting the state to assert claims for restitution on behalf of
indirect purchasers under CUTPA.24o
The decision in Mylan will force other states to grapple with similar
problems. For example, a federal district court has held that indirect purchas-
ers could not recover damages under South Carolina antitrust law.24 The
Mylan court concluded that the state could assert claims for restitution on
behalf of indirect purchasers under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices
Act (SCUTPA).242 The court relied upon provisions of SCUTPA that direct
that interpretations ofthe FTC Act guide courts in construing SCUTPA, 243 and
that authorize the state Attorney General to proceed in equity.244 In an action
in equity by the state Attorney General, a "court may make such additional
orders or judgments as may be necessary to restore any person who has
suffered any ascertainable loss [of] moneys or property" suffered due to a
violation of SCUTPA.245 The court in Mylan concluded that this provision
permits the state to seek restitution on behalf of indirect purchasers.2" The
South Carolina statute also creates a private right of action that gives standing
to sue for damages to "any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of
money or property."'24 The two provisions appear to give standing to exactly
the same set of plaintiffs. Because under Mylan, these plaintiffs include
1002 (Conn. 1984) (holding that reference to "such seller or lessor" contained in 1975 amend-
ment maintained privity requirement of original).
238. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110g(a) (1997) (providing private right of action for
violation of Act).
239. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110b(b) (1997).
240. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1999) (order granting
motion for reconsideration) (noting deference clause and asserting that "[t]he Court will there-
fore reinstate Connecticut's claim for restitution on behalf ofindirect purchasers").
241. See In reWiring Device Antitrust Litig., 498 F. Supp. 79, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (fol-
lowing rule of Illinois Brick limiting recovery under South Carolina antitrust statute to direct
purchasers).
242. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1,13 (DD..C. 1999) (reinstating claims
for restitution on behalf of indirect purchasers).
243. See id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985)).
244. See id. (citing S.C. CODBANN. § 39-5-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985)).
245. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 39-5-50(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (emphasis added).
246. See Mylan, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 13 ("The court will therefore reinstate South Carolina's
claim for restitution on behalf of indirect purchasers.").
247. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (emphasis added).
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indirect purchasers, the Mylan decision may have given indirect purchasers
a private right of action for antitrust violations that they would not otherwise
have had. The implications of the Mylan decision, then, extend well beyond
the risk of multiple liability and complexity that may be introduced into
federal antitrust cases in which the Federal Trade Commission seeks equitable
monetary relief.
IV Conclusion
Section 13(b) ofthe FTC Act has developed from an incidental and non-
germane amendment to the 1973 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act into a powerful
tool for the Federal Trade Commission, and indirectly, for state attorneys gen-
eral.24 The Mylan decision's interpretation of the provision does not purport
to determine what Congress intended when it enacted Section 13(b). Instead,
the court merely states that "Congress must be taken to have acted cognizant
of the historic power of equity to provide complete relief in light of the
statutory purposes. 
249
In Porter v. Warner, the Supreme Court explained that courts should
not grant equitable remedies when the statute gives rise to a necessary and
inescapable inference that Congress did not intend such remedies." ° More-
over, the Court asserted, 'courts should exercise their equitable powers to
give effect to the purposes of Congress." 1 The Court based its decision in
Illinois Brick on what it thought were the purposes of Congress in enacting
the federal antitrust laws.2 2 The FTC Act incorporates these purposes by
empowering the Commission to enforce the antitrust laws, as well as the
policies that drive them."3 The Mylan decision interprets Section 13(b) of
the Act in a way that directly contravenes those purposes, implicating all of
the concerns the Supreme Court raised in Illinois Brick. For these reasons,
Mylan was wrongly decided. 4 Moreover, decided differently, Mylan would
248. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of Sec-.
tion 13(b)).
249. FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25,37 (D.D.C. 1999) (quoting litchell v.
DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288,291-92 (1960) (affirming Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,
328 U.S. 395 (1946)).
250. See supra note 70-81 and accompanying text (discussing Porter).
251. Id.
252. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93,105-06 (1989) (referring to "congres-
sional purposes" on whichIlinoisBrickwas based).
253. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text (discussing laws and policies encom-
passed in FTC Act's prohibition on "unfair methods of competition").
254. On July 12,2000, the parties announced that they had agreed to a settlement in which
Mylan would pay $135 million but admit to no wrongdoing. Sharon Bernstein, DrugMaker
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have provided a consistent federal policy from which states could draw in
interpreting their Little FTC Acts.
to Setle Casefor $135 Million, L.A. TIMEs, July 13, 2000, at C1. Thus, the Mlan decision
will remain good law until the Commission once again seeks restitution in an antitrust case and
its authority to do so is challenged.
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